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Most plan sponsors do not actively manage all of their assets, and many do not directly buy or 
sell any of their assets.  Rather, plan sponsors typically hire investment managers to buy and sell the 
plan’s assets.  For example, say a pension fund decides to allocate $50 million to a manager with a US 
mandate.  This manager would then invest the $50 million in US stocks, and the plan sponsor would 
compensate the manager by paying him/her a percentage of the assets (usually 0.5-1.0% annually).  
Thus, a plan sponsor’s primary responsibility is to evaluate investment managers and decide on the 
optimal way to allocate capital among these managers.  This paper will focus on the performance 
evaluation of equity managers. 
Historically, plan sponsors have segmented their equity portfolio into two separate portfolios: a 
US portfolio and an international portfolio.  As such, plan sponsors hire investment managers with 
either a US mandate or a non-US (NUS) mandate.  US managers can only invest in stocks domiciled 
in the US, and NUS managers can only invest in stocks domiciled outside of the US.  This method 
allows plan sponsors to diversify their portfolio while controlling their exposure to the two markets.   
There is a new and growing set of equity managers, however, who have a global mandate.  
These managers do not have the same restrictions as US and NUS managers and they can invest in 
stocks domiciled in both the US and in other countries.  Many institutional investors see promise in 
global managers for two reasons.  Firstly, as globalization runs its course the differences between US 
stocks and NUS stocks becomes increasingly arbitrary.  Most large US companies do a substantial 
amount of business overseas, and many NUS companies buy and sell in the US.  As such, US stock 
prices are dependent on events in foreign markets and vice-versa—in short, stock prices are becoming 
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increasingly integrated around the world.  If markets are becoming more integrated, then intuition 
suggests that a company’s sector or industry would better describe its risk-return characteristics than 
the company’s home.  This point is argued by Barnes and Cavaglia: “Globally, the significant increase 
in cross-border mergers and acquisitions has resulted in greater geographic diversification of earnings 
and a diminution of corporate identification with a single country” (Barnes et. al 2001).  Similarly, 
“the mergers and acquisitions evidence suggests that firms are restructuring by focusing on their core 
production activity while expanding across borders” (Cavaglia et. al 2004).  Of course, this effect 
varies by country and by industry—less developed countries tend to have a more significant impact on 
stocks than larger countries, and European stocks are more integrated than emerging markets in Asia.  
Additionally, information technology stocks are highly correlated across countries, whereas financials 
are regulated differently and are thus not as highly correlated. 
The magnitude of stock price integration is contested by numerous other studies.  Griffin and 
Karolyi (1998) find that less than 4% of variation in country index returns can be explained by 
industry effects.  If industry factors play such a small role in determining international stock returns, 
then the distinction between US and NUS managers should not be ignored.  Brooks and DelNegro 
(2004) document a strong increase in the importance of sector effects in the mid-1990s, but they find 
that this increase is limited to the technology, media, and telecommunications (TMT) sector.  Outside 
of TMT there is little evidence to support that sector factors are increasing in importance—but a true 
increase in stock price integration should not be limited to a certain sector.  Furthermore, the volatile 
nature of the TMT sector leads the authors to believe that the rise of industry effects in the 1990s was 
a result of the technology bubble.   
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Secondly, a manager with an increased breadth of investment decisions should be able to 
outperform a more constrained manager on a risk-adjusted basis.  The logic for this argument lies in 
Richard Grinold’s (1989) “Fundamental Law of Active Management,” which states: assuming a 
manager has skill, an increase in the number of independent, active decisions available per year 
(breadth) will increase the manager’s risk-adjusted return.  Removing geographical constraints 
effectively doubles a fund manager’s set of potential securities and the fund’s breadth doubles.  If this 
manager has skill, Grinold’s law predicts that global managers should outperform the constrained US 
and NUS managers. 
Past studies on global equity management have compared equity correlations across sectors 
with correlations across countries when making a case for or against global equity investing(Speidell 
et al, Brooks and DelNegro 2004), but no one has directly evaluated managers identified as global 
equity managers.  By doing so, we are able to test if the justifications for global managers are realized 
in practice.  A limitation of our study results from a survivorship bias in the data.  Institutional 
managers who stopped reporting returns are dropped from the database.  This means that funds that 
were taken over or liquidated between 1989 and 2007 are not included in the analysis.  The bias exists 
for global, US, and NUS managers alike. 
This paper evaluates and compares the returns of global, US, and NUS managers by employing 
the methodology found in the finance literature on performance evaluation.  Using classical tests of 
performance evaluation, we find evidence that global managers can outperform the market on a risk-
adjusted basis.  Despite the arguments in favor of global equity, we find that global equity managers 
do not display reliable performance persistence.  Global managers who outperform the market in one 
period generally do not beat the market the next period, so the “winning” managers are re-shuffled 
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each period.  Conversely, US and NUS managers tend to display more reliable performance 
persistence than global managers.  Our final test evaluates global managers’ ability to time the 
markets.  Since global managers have the unique ability to shift assets in and out of different regions, 
it is possible that global managers are adding value by outguessing the market—shifting assets into the 
US when the US market performs relatively well, and shifting assets out of the US when other regions 







Section 2.1 Classical Performance Evaluation 
 Evaluating portfolio managers on a risk-adjusted basis began in the 1960s with Treynor (1965), 
Sharpe (1966), and Jensen (1967).  These classical studies sought to account for the risks managers 
take—a manager who earns a 20% return is not necessarily more skilled than a manager who earns a 
5% return if the former took larger risks that exposed the portfolio to larger downturns.  Taking risks 
does not require skill, but beating a risk-benchmark does. 
Treynor points out that a manager’s return in one period is highly dependent on market 
fluctuations outside of his/her control.  Furthermore, evaluating a manager by his average return does 
not allow for an investor’s risk aversion.  Treynor develops the characteristic line to rank managers on 
a risk-adjusted basis.  This measure treats a manager’s return as a function of the market’s return in 
any given period.  If a manager has significant deviations from the characteristic line, then either the 
manager is not well diversified or he is altering the volatility of the fund, perhaps to speculate on 
fluctuations in the market.  Such speculation leaves the plan sponsor unaware of the level of risk in the 
portfolio, but the uncertainty may be worthwhile if the manager is able to improve the rate of return.  
By observing a manager’s characteristic line, a plan sponsor can better understand the volatility 
associated with the fund and determine if that volatility remains constant.  Furthermore, since 
investors prefer lower uncertainty for a given level of return, the characteristic line can provide a way 
to rank managers on a risk-adjusted basis.  Two characteristic lines with equal slopes have the same 
level of risk, so the manager with a higher characteristic line is a superior manager.  All managers can 
be compared by looking at the intercept of a manager’s characteristic line with the horizontal line 
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representing the risk-free rate.  Thus this ranking measure is independent of risk-preferences and 
market fluctuations. 
Sharpe (66) evaluates managers using Treynor’s index.  He finds that the Treynor index is a 
good predictor of a manager’s future reward-to-variability ratio, which is defined as a manager’s 
returns above the risk-free rate divided by the manager’s standard deviation in returns.  Sharpe also 
looks at the effect of expense ratios and fund size on the fund’s return-to-variability ratio.  He finds 
that funds with high expense ratios tend to have a higher reward-to-variability ratio, and that expense 
ratios do a better job of predicting a manager’s future reward-to-variability ratio than the manager’s 
Treynor Index.  Conversely, Sharpe finds that manager size is a weak predictor of a manager’s future 
reward-to-variability ratio.  Finally, he concludes that capital markets are highly efficient and that 
managers cannot outperform the market when evaluated by the return-to-variability ratio. 
Jensen (1967) contributes to the literature by providing an absolute measure of performance, 
whereas Treynor and Sharpe presented relative measures.  This absolute measure is known as Jensen’s 
alpha, and it measures a manager’s ability to predict future security prices.  If a manager can predict 
future stock prices, then his returns will be greater than the model used by Sharpe and Treynor: 
 
 Jensen arrives at the following model: 
 
where alpha is the manager’s ability to predict future security prices.  By regressing the excess returns 
of mutual funds on the market’s excess return, Jensen is able to estimate the manager’s alpha.  He 
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finds that managers in his sample do not display a statistically significant alpha, and concludes that 
mutual fund managers as a group do not possess the ability to predict future security prices. 
Section 2.2 Multifactor Models 
These three seminal papers changed the way investors thought of risk, but there were many 
holes that needed addressed.  First, these models assume that the only relevant risk factor is the 
market’s excess return.  The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which serves as the theoretical 
backbone to the classical studies, has since been replaced by the multifactor arbitrage pricing theorem.   
The Fama-French (1992) paper empirically identified additional factors that explain stock returns, 
essentially rejecting the CAPM.  The additional factors are a “high-minus-low” (HML) portfolio and a 
“small-minus-big” (SMB) portfolio.  The HML portfolio measures the difference in returns between 
stocks with a high book-to-market ratio and a low book-to-market ratio.  This risk is commonly 
referred to as the value-growth factor: growth stocks like Google have a very low book-to-market ratio 
and likely have a very different risk-profile than value stocks like AEP that have a very high book-to-
market ratio.  Similarly, the SMB portfolio accounts for differences in size, and a small firm is thought 
to be more risky than a large firm.  This three factor model does a better job of explaining stock 
returns than the traditional CAPM model, but it still does not account for international risk factors.   
It is likely that foreign markets do not demonstrate the same risk-return characteristics as the 
US market, and Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2007) provide insights on international risk factors.  They find 
that the international CAPM model does not explain variations in size, momentum, or value across 
stocks.  Furthermore, momentum, cash-flow/price and the global market factors reliably explain return 
variations in international stocks.  They also find that other measures of the value-growth factor (such 
as earnings/price ratio, book-to-market ratio) are not interchangeable with the cash-flow/price ratio.  In 
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order to properly measure a manager’s skill, any performance evaluation of equity managers should 
employ these risk factors. 
Section 2.3 Performance Persistence 
Second, the classical models do not adequately account for changes in risk and skill over time.   
Sharpe (1992) provides a way to measure a fund’s behavior over time with what is now referred to as 
style analysis.  By breaking a manager’s historical returns into sub-periods, we can observe how that 
manager’s style changes.  Sharpe estimates a fund’s style with returns from months t-60 to t-1 and 
then calculates the return for that style in time t.  The difference between a fund’s actual returns and 
the style’s return is thought to be the fund’s selection return.  A high selection return indicates stock-
picking skill that allows a manager to beat his style.  This technique allows investors to see how funds 
change their styles over time and it provides a measure of skill. 
The next question is whether or not an investment manager can persist in delivering positive 
risk-adjusted returns.  A pension fund is not interested in managers who have delivered historic alpha 
if the managers do not demonstrate persistence.  Each period some managers will beat the market 
while others underperform, and the relevant question is: do managers who beat the market one period 
tend to beat the market the next period? Or are the “winners” reshuffled each period?  If managers 
demonstrate persistence, then a pension fund could potentially shift assets to past winners and expect 
them to continue to deliver positive risk-adjusted returns.  Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) 
find a “Hot Hands” phenomenon where fund managers that beat the market one period show short-
term persistence.  They find that a strategy of selecting mutual fund managers each quarter based on 
the previous four quarters of returns can provide significant returns above the average mutual fund.  
They also document the opposite effect—“Icy Hands”—where inferior managers tend to deliver 
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inferior returns in the short term.  Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) document a similar phenomenon, 
but they contend that performance persistence lasts longer than was suggested by Hendricks, Patel, 
and Zeckhauser.  Additionally, they document the “Icy Hands” effect but attribute it to expense ratios.  
Large expense ratios in the bottom decile of managers explain much of their underperformance, but 
the authors also allow for differences in skill. 
Carhart (1997) changed the way investment managers are evaluated by introducing a risk 
factor for momentum.  He used the fact that winning stocks that perform relatively well in a given year 
tend to perform relatively well in the following year.  By subtracting the returns of the previous year’s 
loser stocks from the returns of the previous year’s winner stocks, Carhart created a factor for 
momentum.  A purely mechanical strategy of investing in last year’s winners does not take any stock-
selection skill, so any measure of performance should account for this factor.  Carhart finds that his 
four-factor model, which accounts for market-risk, size-oriented risk, value-oriented risk, and 
momentum-oriented risk, along with investment costs can explain almost all of the “important 
predictability in mutual fund returns.”  Furthermore, he finds that managers do not follow momentum 
strategies, but that some managers hold relatively large positions in last year’s winning stocks by 
chance.  Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers confirm Carhart’s findings using benchmarks based 
on the characteristics of stocks in a manager’s portfolio.  They find that managers can slightly beat 
mechanical strategies, and the margin is likely equal to the management fees.  This is consistent with 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), who find that traders can beat the market just enough to earn back their 
fees. 
All of the previously mentioned studies have focused on mutual fund evaluation, but there are 
trillions of dollars invested with institutional money managers.  Where most of the current studies on 
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mutual funds find little evidence of performance persistence, Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) 
and Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2006) find substantial risk-adjusted excess returns.  The former study 
looked at US equity managers and found that the best managers outperform the market, but the 
manager’s skill is sensitive to the benchmark selection.  Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2006) found that 
institutional managers demonstrate persistent risk-adjusted returns for up to three years.  Within three 
years, however, the winning portfolios tend to attract an influx of capital which likely decreases the 
fund’s ability to provide risk-adjusted returns. 
Section 2.4 Market Timing 
Thus far, I have examined literature that evaluates a manager’s skill at selecting underpriced 
stocks.  Managers can add value in a second way by timing the market.  Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
examine fund managers’ ability to predict large market movements.  If a manager foresees an upturn, 
then the manager should shift into more volatile stocks and increase his exposure to the market.  On 
the other hand, if a downturn looms then a manager should shift into more conservative assets that will 
not go down as much as the market average.  If a manager can outguess the market with better than 
average success, then the manager’s returns should display a quadratic relationship with the market’s 
rate of return.  A high market rate of return results in the manager shifting to a more risky (steep) 
characteristic line, and a low market rate of return results in the manager shifting to a more 
conservative (shallow) characteristic line.  The authors find that mutual funds are not able to time the 
market and conclude that any variations in fund returns are the result of fluctuations in the general 
market or in the manager’s skill in selecting underpriced stocks.  Admati, Bhattacharya, Pfleiderer, 
and Ross (1986) confirm that a simple quadratic regression is a valid measurement of a manager’s 
market timing ability. 
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Finally, it is important to mention the effects of an attrition bias on studies of performance 
evaluation.  If a database does not include the returns on managers that went out of business, then the 
sample is biased upward.  Managers who take on a great deal of risk have a higher probability of 
failure, yet they also have a larger expected return.  If the failed managers are not included in the 
sample, then we only observe managers who took the big risks and won.  This could lead to 
persistence as is documented in Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992).  They find that a 
small survivorship bias can lead to a significant pattern of performance persistence.  Carpenter and 
Lynch (1999) find that a survivorship bias induces a strong reversal effect if fund survival depends on 
multi-period persistence.  That is, if persistent losers are eventually dropped from the database due to 





DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Section 3.1 Data Description 
We obtained data from the Wilshire Compass database.  Wilshire provides data, services, and 
consulting to plan sponsors, foundations and endowments, and consultants.  They have over 200 
clients, which represents one third of the top fifty pension funds and assets over $1.5 trillion.  All of 
the data in the Wilshire database is self-reported by institutional investment managers, and Wilshire 
does not charge a fee for a manager to be included in the database.  Many of Wilshire’s clients use the 
database to search for investment managers that will fit the plan’s needs. 
The database provides monthly returns of investment managers, and we use the sample period 
1989-2007.  Descriptive statistics on the managers in our sample can be found in Table 1.  Our sample 
contains only “live” portfolios, so any fund that exited the market due to liquidation, closure, merger, 
and bankruptcy from 1989-2007 is not included in our sample.  This leads to an attrition rate of 0.0% 
and a survivorship bias.  Past studies suggest a typical attrition of 3% per year (Carhart 1997, Busse et. 
al 2006). Additionally, many firms manage more than one portfolio.  It is typical for a given 
investment firm to offer various portfolios that specialize by size, capitalization, or geography.  We 
use returns from each individual portfolio.  Returns are net of trading costs but gross of management 
fees.  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on manager returns in the database across funds. 
Along with returns, managers can report a number of important fund characteristics.  Managers 
can identify with various style assignments, including “Core/Blend,” “Growth,” “Value,” “Varies By 
Country,” or they can choose not to report a style.  Similarly, managers identify with one of the 
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following capitalization focuses: “Broad/Combination,” “Large,” “Mid,” or “Not Reported.”  Many 
pension funds are concerned with measuring a manager’s performance relative to a benchmark, and 
managers have the opportunity to suggest the most appropriate benchmark.  The most popular 
benchmarks include the MSCI World Index and the MSCI AC World Index, though one quarter of 
managers do not provide a recommended benchmark.  Managers also report the assets under 
management (AUM) for each portfolio, though this number is reported somewhat sporadically.  Some 
managers report AUM for every quarter they are active, some report AUM once per year, and some do 
not report it.  “Manager Experience” is also reported inconsistently.  Even if an investment 
professional is listed as the manager of a given portfolio, the professional’s role in managing the 
portfolio is questionable.  For instance, Dimensional Fund Advisors list their CEO, David Booth as 
one of the investment professionals for each of its portfolios.  Thus, this field in the database is not 
very reliable.  Finally, fees are more difficult to account for when studying institutional money 
managers.  A fund’s management fee will almost always depend on the amount of assets a plan 
sponsor commits to a fund.  A large investment will usually result in a lower management fee (as a 
percent of total assets).  Additionally, over one-quarter of managers do not report any fee.  Unlike 
mutual funds, fees for institutional clients can be negotiable, so some managers do not report a fee 
schedule.  Typical fees range between 0.5-0.75% of assets annually. Summary statistics on the global 
managers in our database can be found in Table 3, and simple return statistics for global managers can 
be found in Table 4.  Most global managers claim the broadest style and capitalization focus.  
Similarly, most managers recommend the MSCI World Index or the MSCI AC World Index as their 
appropriate benchmark.  Appendix A presents the data provided by a typical manager.  Many of the 













Additionally, we obtain data from Ken French’s data library.  He regularly computes portfolio 
returns based on stock characteristics, and we use a set of his portfolios as our risk factors.  For US 
equity, we use the standard Fama-French Factors for market-oriented risks, size-oriented risks, and 
value-oriented risks.  The market factor is the monthly value-weight return on all stocks listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ less the one-month Treasury bill rate.  To obtain the size and value 
portfolios, stocks are ranked into six portfolios based on size and book-to-market, respectively.  The 
size factor is defined as the average of the three “small” portfolios minus the average of the three “big” 
portfolios, and is commonly referred to as “small-minus-big,” or SMB.  The value factor is defined as 
the average of the two value portfolios less the average of the two growth portfolios and is called 
“high-minus-low,” or HML.  Similarly, the momentum factor is defined as the average of the two high 
prior return portfolios minus the two low prior return portfolios, and is commonly referred to as 
“winners-minus-losers,” or WML.   
The methodology is similar for creating factors for the international market.  The international 
market is generally referred to as “Europe, Australasia, and Far East,” or EAFE.  We include a market 
factor and a value factor for the EAFE market. 
Section 3.2 Classical Techniques 
We conduct three separate tests and look for evidence of skill.  The first test is akin to the 
classical performance evaluation done by Jensen (1967).  We regress all reported returns for each 














where r is the return on portfolio p, and fk is the k-th factor return.  If a manager has 48 months of 
returns, our regression includes all 48 months.  The same is true if a manager only has 8 months or has 
200 months.  The model is estimated for each of the 281 portfolios in our data set.  We used two 
separate models for this test: the 4 Factor model uses the US market’s excess returns, the EAFE 
market’s excess returns, the US HML portfolio, and the EAFE HML portfolio as risk factors; the 6 
Factor model employs all of the factors in the 4 Factor model in addition to a factor for the US SMB 
portfolio and a factor for the US WML portfolio.  All of these factors are obtained from Ken French’s 
web site.  Alpha (α ) is thought of as a manager’s risk-adjusted return—the portion that cannot be 
explained by the risks a manager takes. 
 After we perform tests on the managers’ entire set of returns, we evaluate each manager’s risk-
adjusted returns each year.  If a manager reports at least 8 months of returns in a given year, we 
estimate the following model: 
 
where r is the return on portfolio p, and fk is the k-th factor return.  For global managers, we estimate 
three different models using this methodology.  The first model is the 2 Factor model, where we 
regress a portfolio’s excess returns on the US market’s excess returns and the EAFE market’s excess 
returns.  The 4 Factor model includes the factors in the 2 Factor model in addition to the US HML 
portfolio and the EAFE HML portfolio.  The 6 Factor model includes the factors in the 4 Factor model 
in addition to the US SMB portfolio and the US WML portfolio.  For US managers, we employ the 
same methodology but our model is the Carhart 4-Factor model, which includes risk factors for the US 
market’s excess returns, the US HML portfolio, the US SMB portfolio, and the US WML portfolio.  
Finally, NUS managers are evaluated using a 2 Factor model including the EAFE market’s excess 
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returns and the EAFE HML portfolio.  By estimating parameters each year, we are able to see how 
exposures change among the different groups of managers.  We can also tell if the average manager 
year’s alpha is statistically different from zero. 
Section 3.3 Tests of Persistence 
The thrust of our analysis evaluates a manager’s ability to persistently deliver positive risk-
adjusted returns.  In order to do this, each year we rank every active manager by their risk-adjusted 
return (alpha).  We form deciles based on a manager’s alpha, and we compute the equal-weighted 
return of each decile in the formation period (t=0).  After we have constructed deciles for a given year, 
we follow each decile and compute their equal-weighted alpha in years t=1, t=2, and t=3.  This process 
is repeated for every year in our sample of 1989-2007.  This leaves us with 19 separate formation 
years (1989-2007), 18 periods where t=1 (1990-2007), 17 periods where t=2 (1991-2007), and 16 
periods where t=3 (1992-2007).  For each decile we analyze performance in years 0, 1, 2, and 3.  We 
run into problems when estimating our 6-Factor model since we only require 8 months of returns—this 
requires us to use most of our degrees of freedom, resulting in very imprecise estimates.  To explore 
this issue, we repeat the above analysis using 36-month formation periods and 36-month evaluation 
periods.  Figure 1 illustrates the differences in our two methods.  Using 36-month periods, we have 17 
formation periods (1989-1991, 1990-1992, etc), 14 periods where t=1 (1992-1994, 1993-1995, etc), 13 
periods where t=2, and 12 periods where t=3.  This technique does result in overlapping periods, 
which should build in some level of persistence.  That is, if the first evaluation period is 1992-1994 
and the second evaluation period is 1993-1995, two of the three years overlap between the first and 
second evaluation period.  If a portfolio can deliver positive risk adjusted returns from 1992-1994, 













bad year.  This relationship would seem to result in persistence by construction, provided a manager 
can beat the market in t=1. 
Section 3.4 Timing Tests 
  The last piece of our analysis tests a global manager’s ability to time the market.  If a manager 
can successfully time the US market, for example, his returns should have a positive, quadratic 
relationship with general market movements.  We test for this relationship by estimating the model: 
 
where r is the return on portfolio p, and fk is the k-th factor return.  We include factors for the US 
market’s excess return, the squared term of the US market’s excess return, the EAFE market’s excess 
return, and the squared term of the EAFE market’s excess return.  We refer to the coefficient on the 
squared term of the US market’s excess return as the “US Gamma”, and we refer to the coefficient on 
the squared term of the EAFE market’s excess return as the “EAFE Gamma”.  If a manager can 
“outguess” the US market, then his US Gamma should be positive and statistically distinguishable 






Section 4.1 Full Panel Regressions 
 The results of our full panel regressions are found in Table 5.  Of the 281 global equity 
managers with enough returns to estimate our two models we find that, on average, global managers 
are able to deliver positive risk-adjusted returns between 2.52% and 2.88% annually.  This is not a 
trivial amount and it is well above the typical annual management fee of 0.5-1.0%.  The alphas are 
statistically different from zero and economically significant in both the 4-Factor and 6-Factor model.  
Additionally, the average exposures to the US market and the EAFE market are nearly identical for 
both models.  The 6-Factor model, however, seems to make a significant contribution toward 
explaining the source of global equity returns.  While the average R2 value hardly changed when 
moving from the 4-Factor model to the 6-Factor model, the average exposures to the US HML and 
EAFE HML change significantly with the addition of the US SMB and the US WML factors.  In the 
4-Factor model, the exposure to the two HML portfolios is not statistically or economically 
significant, but in the 6-Factor model the exposure to both HML portfolios approaches statistical 
significance.  Additionally, the US WML portfolio is statistically significant in the 6-Factor model.  
This suggests that managers are able to invest in the prior year’s winners and subsequently improve 
their returns the following year.  It should be noted, however, that this could be a result of the 
survivorship bias in the sample.  Portfolios that held last year’s losing stocks could be dropped from 
the database due to poor performance, leaving only the survivors with better prior-year performance in 
the database.  
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The distribution of the alphas for the 4-Factor and 6-Factor models can be seen in Figure 2.  
Both distributions appear to be approximately normal and centered slightly above one.  Consistent 
with what has already been mentioned, the distribution of the 6-Factor alphas appears to be tighter 
than that of the 4-Factor alpha, which is evidence that global managers are exposing themselves to the 
US SMB and WML factors.  While we do not have factors for the EAFE SMB and WML factors, it is 
difficult to tell if the alpha distribution would change significantly with the addition of these 
theoretical factors.  If small stocks and prior winners are considered to be more risky than large stocks 
and prior losers, then the US SMB and WML factors should be positively correlated with the EAFE 
SMB and WML portfolios.  Suppose this was not the case—then investors could diversify away the 
SMB and WML risk by investing in the US and EAFE SMB and WML portfolios, but this would be 
contrary to the belief that investors should only be compensated for systematic risk.  Rather, correlated 
US and EAFE risk factors imply that the alpha distribution would not change significantly with the 
addition of theoretical EAFE SMB and WML factors. 
Section 4.2 Manager Year Results 
The next step in the analysis is to compute an alpha for each manager year in the sample.  The 
results of our estimations are found in Table 6.  We find that the global 2-Factor model implies an 
annual risk-adjusted return of 1.92%, but the global 4-Factor model implies an annual risk-adjusted 
return of only 0.72%, which is near a typical management fee.  Furthermore, the global 6-Factor 
model yields an alpha indistinguishable from 0.00%.  These numbers are in stark contrast to the US 4-
Factor model and the NUS 2-Factor model, which imply annual risk-adjusted returns of 1.8% and 
2.76%, respectively.   
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The addition of HML, SMB, and WML factors to the global models seem to significantly 
increase the explanatory power of the model.  With the addition of the US SMB and WML portfolios, 
the US HML exposure becomes statistically significant and the US SMB and WML factors are also 
significant and positive.  Again, this could be the result of a survivorship bias since the database drops 
losing portfolios that likely selected last year’s losing stocks.  No matter what model we estimate, the 
average exposures to the US market and the EAFE market remain largely unchanged and nearly sum 
to one. 
Estimating the global models annually allow us to view changes in global managers’ styles 
over time.  Table 7 lists the number of active portfolios for each year in the sample.  Since 2001 the 
number of global portfolios has grown faster than the number of US portfolios each year, while the 
number of NUS portfolios grew at about the same rate as global portfolios.  Figure 3 demonstrates 
how the average global manager’s exposures change over the period of 1989-2007.  For each panel we 
only present exposures for the added factors—that is, in the 4-Factor model we only show exposures 
to the US HML and the EAFE HML, even though the 4-Factor model also includes the US market and 
EAFE market factor.  We do this because the exposures tend not to change substantially as we add 
other factors.  The most obvious pattern is the increasing exposure to the EAFE market, which 
corresponds to decreasing exposure to the US market.  The two exposures intersect around the time of 
the technology bubble, but after 2003 global managers have consistently increased their exposure to 
the EAFE market while decreasing their exposure to the US market.  This pattern is not surprising as 
many international markets have begun to open up in the past ten years and the domestic market is 
very competitive for equity managers.  Additional factors for HML, SMB, and WML are much 
smaller and noisier.  Both the US and the EAFE HML exposures tend to stay above zero, but with 
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fairly wide fluctuations across years.  The US SMB exposure also tends to stay above zero but is much 
less noisy.  Finally, the US WML exposure seems to oscillate around zero. 
Section 4.3 Persistence among Global Managers 
The next sets of tests evaluate performance persistence among institutional equity managers.  
From a plan sponsor’s perspective, it is not particularly helpful to know that global managers can 
deliver positive risk-adjusted returns over the course of their lifetime.  Rather, a plan sponsor would 
like to predict which managers are most likely to beat the market in the future.  Our persistence tests 
rank managers in deciles during the formation year and follow each decile into subsequent periods.  If 
managers are persistent, then the top managers in one period should deliver positive risk-adjusted 
returns in subsequent periods.  Likewise, the worst managers in one period should deliver negative 
risk-adjusted returns in subsequent periods.  Table 8 shows the results of our persistence tests when we 
rank global managers in 12-month periods and then evaluate each decile in each of the following three 
years.  The top decile seems to display persistence in the first evaluation period for each of the three 
models we test, and its risk-adjusted return is estimated to be between 3.12% and 3.84% annually.  
Additionally, the spread between the top and bottom decile is statistically different from zero in the 
first evaluation period and is estimated to be between 2.40% and 4.68% annually.  This persistence 
does not continue into the second or third evaluation periods, nor is there any sign of persistence 
among any of the other deciles regardless of the model we use.  The second decile, for instance, is 
estimated to only have an annual risk-adjusted return between 0.12% and 1.08% in the first evaluation 
period, though this is not statistically different from zero. 
As previously mentioned, our annual tests may be imprecise since we only require eight 
months of returns to compute two-, four-, and six-factor models.  We use 36-month ranking and 
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evaluation periods to account for this.  The results of our persistence tests for global managers using 
36-month portfolio formation periods and 36-month evaluation periods are found in Table 9.  This is a 
fairly demanding test because in order to show persistence a manager would have to outperform the 
market over two back-to-back three-year periods, which is considered very long-term in the literature.  
We find no evidence of performance persistence among the top deciles, but we document a very strong 
reversal in alpha among the worst-ranked decile.  This reversal is consistent with a world where fund 
survival is dependent on multiple years of returns.  The bottom deciles had to outperform the market in 
evaluation periods lest they go out of business and disappear from our database.  This demonstrates a 
limitation in using the spread between the top and bottom decile as a measure of performance 
persistence using survivorship-biased data—since the bottom decile is prone to reversals and biased 
upward, the spread does not accurately measure the true difference between the best performers and 
the worst performers in a given period. 
Section 4.4 Persistence among US and NUS Managers 
We perform similar analysis on the sample of US and NUS managers, and the results are 
reported in Table 10.  The highest-ranked 50% of US managers demonstrate fairly reliable 
performance persistence during the following three one-year ranking periods.  The second evaluation 
period is the only period where the spread between the top decile and the bottom decile is not 
statistically significant.  This does not appear to be the result of an underperformance among the top 
decile (the top decile has the highest average alpha in year two), but there appears to be a slight 
reversal among the lowest-ranked decile.  The NUS managers demonstrate a similar pattern for the 
first two evaluation periods.  The top 50% of NUS managers demonstrate fairly reliable persistence for 
two years, but a slight reversal among the bottom decile yields a spread that is not statistically 
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different from zero.  In any case, the top decile of US and NUS managers earn the highest average 
alpha in all three evaluation periods whereas the top ranked global managers are shuffled around in the 
rankings after the first evaluation period. 
These results are counter to the “Fundamental Law of Active Management” and are a bit of a 
puzzle.  If there are two identical managers with identical information, then a manager with a broader 
mandate should be able to outperform the constrained manager.  Since our results show the more 
constrained US and NUS managers outperforming the global managers, we next perform tests to 
determine if cross-sectional differences among global managers are affecting our results.  There are 
four characteristics that we suspect may help explain returns: management fees, assets under 
management, investment mandate, and time period. 
Section 4.5 Cross-Sectional Persistence Tests 
Management fees are almost always discussed in articles on performance evaluation.  Sharpe 
(1966) found that fees are better predictors of a manager’s future Sharpe ratio than the manager’s 
characteristic line.  Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) find that the lowest decile of mutual fund 
managers tend to have very high expenses that partially explain their poor performance, and Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) find that the average mutual fund beats a purely mechanical 
strategy by the average management fee.  Since our results are gross of management fees, we expect 
that, among the top deciles, managers with high fees should outperform managers with low fees.  High 
fees allow managers to conduct more research and contribute more to their gross-of-fees risk-adjusted 
returns.  The results of our test are found in Table 11, Panel A.  We find that, among the top few 
deciles, managers with high fees tend to have higher estimates of their risk-adjusted returns than 
managers with low fees for each model and across all three evaluation periods.  However, neither the 
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high-fee managers nor the low-fee managers display the same levels of performance persistence as the 
US and NUS managers.  The top decile of high-fee managers tend to display persistence for the first 
evaluation period, but persistence disappears after the first period and no other decile displays any 
evidence of persistence.  The top decile of low-fee managers displays very similar patterns—only the 
top managers display persistence in the first period, after which it disappears. 
Panel B shows the results when we split managers by their assets under management (AUM).  
Again, there is a substantial precedent in the literature to observe how assets affect performance.  
Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2006) hypothesize that funds with superior performance in one period tend 
to attract capital flows the next period.  Diseconomies of scale in investment management thus 
eliminate persistence in subsequent years—manager talent is dissipated as assets increase.  This leads 
us to predict that managers with low assets are more nimble and thus more capable of delivering 
persistent risk-adjusted returns than managers with high assets, who may not find enough 
opportunities for mispriced securities to deliver persistent alpha.  Panel B shows little evidence of 
performance persistence among either the low AUM managers or the high AUM managers.  Even the 
top decile of managers do not deliver statistically significant risk-adjusted returns in the first 
evaluation period with the exception of the 4 Factor model low AUM managers.  We conclude that 
AUM does not explain the difference in persistence between global and US/NUS managers. 
The third test separates managers by mandate.  Managers with a broad style and capitalization 
mandate are considered to have a broad mandate, whereas managers with a particular focus (Value, 
Growth, Large-cap, Mid-cap, etc) are classified as narrow mandates.  It is conceivable that a 
manager’s mandate affects the marketing pitch of the product—a narrow mandate could be a way for a 
plan sponsor to more precisely control the plan’s exposures.  A broad mandate, on the other hand, 
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would allow a manager to best take advantage of Grinold’s “Fundamental Law of Active 
Management” in order to deliver risk-adjusted returns.  Panel C of Table 11 presents our findings for 
the two groups of managers.  We find that managers with a narrow mandate display almost no sign of 
persistence in any of the evaluation periods using any of the models.  Managers with a broad mandate, 
however, display relatively reliable persistence when compared to the rest of global managers.  The 
top decile displays persistence in the first, second, and third evaluation periods.  This persistence, 
however, is almost completely confined to the top decile and the 2 Factor and 4 Factor models.  When 
we add factors for the US SMB and US WML, persistence among managers with a broad mandate all 
but disappears.  US and NUS managers demonstrate more reliable persistence than global managers 
even after we divide global managers by mandate. 
Finally, we divide global managers’ returns by time period.  Returns that were earned between 
1989 to 1999 are kept separate from those earned from 2000 to 2007, and the results are in Panel D of 
Table 11.  Global markets behaved differently in the 90s, and many markets have since opened up for 
trade.  Furthermore, the technology bubble at the turn of the century provided firms with the means to 
cheaply communicate and operate on a global scale.  As markets integrate and geographical 
differences appear less important, global managers may be able to beat benchmarks that are 
constructed by geography.  We find no evidence that global managers could display superior 
persistence in 2000-2007 vs. 1989-1999, and this distinction does not help us explain the more reliable 
persistence among US and NUS managers over global managers. 
Section 4.6 Timing Results 
While global managers do not seem able to persistently beat their risk benchmarks, it is 
possible that they can add value in another way.  Global managers are distinct from US and NUS 
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managers because they have the ability to shift assets into the US when they predict that the US will 
outperform the NUS market, or they can shift assets out of the US when they feel that the US will 
underperform.  This characteristic of global managers may give them a better ability to time the 
markets.  While US managers can try to outguess the market by shifting into riskier stocks before an 
upturn, they may be constrained by style and capitalization mandates.  Global managers are, by their 
nature, less constrained.  If global managers can outguess either the US or EAFE market, there should 
be a positive quadratic relationship between the manager’s returns and the market’s returns.  The 
coefficient on the squared term in the regression is referred to as “Gamma.”  Figure 4 displays the 
histogram of the global managers’ US and EAFE Gammas.  We find that global managers are not able, 
as a whole, to time either the US or EAFE market.  It is possible, however, that only a small set of 
managers are attempting to outguess the market while the rest rely on identifying security mispricing.  
To check for this, we perform persistence tests on managers’ US and NUS Gammas.  Table 12 lists the 
results of these tests.  We find that the top decile of global managers is unable to persistently deliver 





 This paper examines the performance of 287 global equity portfolios relative to 3650 US and 
1745 NUS portfolios from 1989 to 2007.  Global managers are a relatively new phenomenon in 
institutional investing, and this small group is gaining considerable attention.  Many practitioners 
believe that global managers provide a more efficient way to allocate a plan’s assets because increased 
integration in global markets makes the distinction between US and NUS stocks increasingly arbitrary, 
and an increase in a manager’s breadth of decisions should correspond to an increase in risk-adjusted 
return. 
 Despite the arguments for global managers, we find limited evidence of their skill.  
Furthermore, global managers are regularly dominated by US and NUS managers when we perform 
identical tests on each of these three sets of managers.  When we perform classical tests of 
performance evaluation, we find that global managers tend to deliver positive risk-adjusted returns 
over the life of the portfolio.  These returns are statistically and economically significant, generally 
greater than the typical management fee of 0.50-1.00% of assets.  We also find that the addition of US 
SMB and WML risk factors makes a significant contribution to our ability to explain a manager’s 
returns.  While these initial results bode well for global managers, we find that the average US and 
NUS manager generally perform much better with similar performance tests. 
 US and NUS managers also demonstrate more reliable performance persistence than global 
manages.  US managers show evidence of persistence for up to three years, and NUS managers tend to 
persist for about two years.  Global managers, however, display signs of persistence in only the top 
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decile of managers in only the first evaluation year.  This result is robust to changes in the risk 
benchmark we use for global managers.  Additionally, this result holds for differences in management 
fees, assets under management, investment mandate, and time period.  We could not find a method by 
which a global manager’s future risk-adjusted returns could be predicted.  Rather, winning global 
portfolios are typically reshuffled each period. 
 The last set of tests sought to determine a global manager’s timing ability.  We found no 
evidence that global managers could outguess either the US or EAFE market.  Additionally, there does 
not appear to be a subset of managers who can persistently time the markets.  Even though this is an 
oft-cited advantage of global managers, the added manager flexibility does not translate into higher 
risk-adjusted returns. 
 Implications of this study face limitations due to the sample survivorship bias.  While this 
cannot be ignored, it is also important to realize that a survivorship bias will tend to bias returns 
upward and increase the perception of persistence.  In this sense, the global managers in our sample 
should be able to demonstrate persistence more easily than if our data was free of survivorship bias.  
The fact that we still could not find evidence of reliable persistence is damaging to the case for global 
managers.  Future study should be done to determine if there is evidence of dissipation in global 
manager skill.  These global funds have been receiving increasingly large amounts of attention year-
over-year, and this may have resulted in an influx of capital.  If global funds have grown faster than 
US and NUS funds, then skill amongst the global managers could have been more quickly diluted, 
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      Global Managers US Managers NUS Managers
Number of Managers  171 962 464
Number of Portfolios  287 3650 1745
Avg. Number of Portfolios per year  101 1580 628
Avg. Size of Portfolio ($MM)  1890 30800 12300








      Global Managers US Managers NUS Managers
Mean  0.948% 0.821% 1.32%
Median  1.30% 1.04% 1.56%
Percent positive  63.6% 62.0% 66.2%
Standard deviation  3.99% 4.25% 4.19%


































Core / Blend  121  79.58 1432.65 112 84  64
Growth  70  97.31 1792.87 68 55  48
Value  76  90.17 2999.46 72 60  44
Varies By Country  3  122.67 1188.03 3 3  3
Not Reported  17  83.24 731.95 17 16  14
Capitalization Focus 
Broad / 
Combination  147  85.80 1707.79 138 108  85
Large  115  87.47 1837.30 110 87  66
Mid  6  97.17 3250.21 5 4  4
Not Reported  19  95.95 3362.48 19 19  18
Assets Under Management 
$0‐100MM  83  66.12 38.91 74 47  38
$100‐1000MM  110  83.84 417.07 106 85  68
$1000+ MM  91  113.16 5401.60 91 85  66
Not Reported  3  23.00 0.00 1 1  1
Fee Range on $75MM 
0.0‐0.5%  12  67.50 998.11 11 8  8
0.5‐0.75%  131  97.30 2396.89 126 102  84
0.75‐1.0%  47  88.70 1478.63 42 36  27
1.0‐1.25%  10  63.90 357.78 10 5  3
1.25%+  8  74.25 586.62 8 7  5

























MSCI World Index  130 97.32 1900.39 121  99 84
MSCI AC World Index  32 76.09 3109.86 31  23 16
MSCI AC World Ex‐US 
Index  11 94.36 1055.65 11  11 10
MSCI EAFE Index  11 73.91 1717.02 11  8 7
MSCI World Growth  6 56.50 1287.05 6  3 1
MSCI World Ex US 
Index  3 105.33 163.18 3  3 2
MSCI World Ex USA 
Growth  3 31.33 80.56 3  1 0
MSCI World Value  2 24.50 524.98 2  0 0
Nareit EPRA Nareit 
Global Index  2 100.00 313.07 2  1 1
Other  15 81.67 1049.03 13  9 8
Not Reported  72 82.18 1966.51 69  60 44
Manager Experience 
<10 years  2 22.00 69.21 2  0 0
10‐15  7 63.29 327.88 7  5 3
15‐20  33 77.06 1289.13 32  20 16
20‐25  54 83.52 1731.14 53  46 32
25‐30  69 95.00 1913.98 67  57 47
30‐35  32 114.13 4007.85 32  27 23
35‐40  22 105.05 2834.43 21  19 16
over 40  24 108.13 1372.75 23  21 18
Not Reported  44 55.09 1127.71 35  23 18
Years of Returns in Database 
1‐3 years  54 23.24 377.08 54  0 0
3‐5 years  45 46.98 1758.96 45  45 0
Less than 1 year  15 5.93 114.47 0  0 0
Over 5 years  173 124.97 2555.43 173  173 173
























Core / Blend  0.84 0.63 3.85 ‐0.53  0.88 0.23
Growth  1.07 0.63 4.73 ‐0.28  2.13 0.24
Value  1.03 0.64 3.92 ‐0.52  0.99 0.26
Varies By Country  1.20 0.72 2.99 ‐0.44  0.76 0.45
Not Reported  0.78 0.68 2.40 ‐0.56  1.35 0.35
Capitalization focus 
Broad / Combination  1.00 0.64 4.00 ‐0.42  1.49 0.26
Large  0.92 0.63 4.11 ‐0.52  0.95 0.23
Mid  0.49 0.59 5.12 ‐0.58  1.00 0.08
Not Reported  0.88 0.68 2.75 ‐0.49  1.16 0.34
AUM ($MM) 
$0‐100MM  0.86 0.62 4.11 ‐0.39  0.97 0.22
$1000+ MM  1.01 0.64 3.94 ‐0.52  1.07 0.28
$100‐1000MM  0.99 0.64 3.95 ‐0.49  1.61 0.26
Not Reported  ‐0.54 0.48 3.23 ‐0.08  0.14 ‐0.05
Fee Range on $75MM 
0.0‐0.5%  0.59 0.61 4.56 ‐0.46  0.55 0.14
0.5‐0.75%  0.88 0.63 3.97 ‐0.55  1.54 0.23
0.75‐1.0%  1.06 0.64 4.23 ‐0.46  0.94 0.26
1.0‐1.25%  1.55 0.64 5.89 ‐0.20  1.69 0.26
1.25%+  1.23 0.65 4.08 ‐0.26  0.16 0.30














MSCI World Index  0.89 0.63  4.02 ‐0.50 1.55  0.23
MSCI AC World Index  0.87 0.62  3.94 ‐0.39 0.63  0.24
MSCI AC World Ex‐US Index  1.19 0.65  4.37 ‐0.50 0.56  0.28
MSCI EAFE Index  1.24 0.65  4.55 ‐0.61 0.86  0.27
MSCI World Growth  1.17 0.67  4.09 ‐0.59 1.16  0.30
MSCI World Ex US Index  1.09 0.64  4.35 ‐0.64 1.27  0.24
MSCI World Ex USA Growth  0.87 0.63  3.58 ‐0.49 1.13  0.33
MSCI World Value  0.78 0.64  3.34 ‐0.79 0.53  0.23
Nareit EPRA Nareit Global Index  0.63 0.67  4.11 ‐0.66 0.21  0.16
Other  0.78 0.61  3.94 ‐0.45 1.40  0.21
Not Reported  1.03 0.65  3.82 ‐0.39 1.16  0.29
 
Manager Experience 
<10 years  1.39 0.70  5.37 ‐1.07  1.36  0.27 
10‐15  0.88 0.64  3.30 ‐0.38  0.08  0.32 
15‐20  0.73 0.61  3.75 ‐0.43  0.92  0.18 
20‐25  1.01 0.64  3.94 ‐0.52  0.89  0.28 
25‐30  0.99 0.64  4.14 ‐0.44  1.81  0.25 
30‐35  1.07 0.65  3.86 ‐0.51  1.73  0.29 
35‐40  1.07 0.66  3.84 ‐0.62  1.41  0.29 
over 40  0.91 0.63  3.93 ‐0.46  0.89  0.26 
Not Reported  0.85 0.62  4.24 ‐0.35  0.96  0.22 
Years of Returns Available 
Less than 1 year  ‐0.61 0.47  4.38 ‐0.12  0.10  ‐0.15 
1‐3 years  0.93 0.63  3.72 ‐0.66  0.76  0.25 
3‐5 years  1.24 0.67  3.43 ‐0.48  0.38  0.37 
Over 5 years  0.98 0.64  4.19 ‐0.43  1.68  0.25 




























pα Alpha  0.24  (7.12) 0.21  (4.44) 
1,pβ US Market  0.39  (17.6) 0.39  (18.8) 
2,pβ EAFE Market  0.57  (26.5) 0.56  (27.2) 
3,pβ US HML  0.01  (0.73) 0.04  (1.84) 





































2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 4 factor 2 factor
Avg. Alpha 0.16 (8.99) 0.06 (3.13) 0.01 (0.52) 0.15 (17.20) 0.23 (19.18)
Avg. US Mkt 0.43 (43.8) 0.44 (37.8) 0.41 (32.5)





Avg. r‐sq 0.82 0.88 0.93















1989  12  79  157 
1990  15  106  201 
1991  19  131  264 
1992  22  158  339 
1993  25  191  441 
1994  32  240  536 
1995  46  308  746 
1996  59  375  924 
1997  68  446  1117 
1998  81  548  1340 
1999  98  638  1605 
2000  110  721  1823 
2001  131  815  2104 
2002  153  923  2311 
2003  174  1054  2575 
2004  197  1159  2799 
2005  223  1318  3068 
2006  243  1462  3266 


























1 1.35 (9.37) 1.47 (8.06) 1.65 (8.42) 0.31 (2.22) 0.32 (1.86) 0.26 (1.97) 0.11 (0.77) 0.21 (1.39) 0.05 (0.36) 0.07 (0.57) 0.09 (0.53) ‐0.22 (‐1.35)
2 0.67 (8.87) 0.66 (8.32) 0.66 (8.56) 0.09 (1.10) 0.06 (0.73) 0.01 (0.10) 0.21 (2.34) 0.03 (0.21) ‐0.12 (‐1.02) 0.08 (0.98) 0.07 (0.52) 0.00 (0.04)
3 0.47 (7.03) 0.39 (6.18) 0.40 (5.72) 0.11 (1.17) 0.16 (1.48) 0.00 (0.01) 0.05 (0.52) 0.11 (1.29) ‐0.03 (‐0.25) 0.03 (0.32) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.08)
4 0.33 (5.15) 0.23 (3.90) 0.22 (2.97) 0.22 (2.34) 0.00 (‐0.07) 0.08 (0.76) 0.21 (1.62) 0.04 (0.31) ‐0.12 (‐0.88) 0.07 (0.67) 0.04 (0.43) ‐0.14 (‐1.27)
5 0.20 (3.31) 0.12 (2.10) 0.09 (‐1.20) 0.10 (1.38) 0.11 (1.76) 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (2.11) ‐0.02 (‐0.26) 0.16 (1.19) 0.17 (1.65) 0.11 (1.20) 0.11 (0.79)
6 0.09 (1.50) 0.00 (0.02) ‐0.04 (‐0.53) 0.15 (1.78) ‐0.01 (‐0.17) ‐0.06 (‐0.79) 0.11 (1.34) 0.00 (0.05) ‐0.07 (‐0.65) ‐0.00 (‐0.07) ‐0.00 (‐0.02) ‐0.04 (‐0.52)
7 ‐0.03 (‐0.65) ‐0.13 (‐2.33) ‐0.17 (‐1.98) 0.09 (1.02) ‐0.01 (‐0.19) 0.03 (0.24) 0.12 (2.00) ‐0.01 (‐0.15) 0.09 (1.05) 0.14 (2.27) 6.70 (0.00) ‐0.00 (‐0.01)
8 ‐0.18 (‐3.08) ‐0.30 (‐4.50) ‐0.32 (‐3.45) ‐0.02 (‐0.24) 0.00 (‐0.06) 0.01 (0.14) 0.19 (1.48) 0.07 (0.59) ‐0.06 (‐0.50) 0.16 (2.10) 0.01 (0.13) 0.02 (0.25)
9 ‐0.38 (‐5.36) ‐0.49 (‐6.04) ‐0.57 (‐5.64) 0.18 (1.87) 0.01 (0.19) ‐0.08 (‐0.62) 0.11 (1.26) 0.00 (‐0.01) ‐0.03 (‐0.43) 0.19 (1.73) ‐0.10 (‐1.07) ‐0.12 (‐0.96)
10 ‐0.86 (‐8.13) ‐1.03 (‐7.40) ‐1.21 (‐7.00) 0.07 (0.63) ‐0.07 (‐0.54) ‐0.13 (‐1.16) 0.22 (1.85) 0.05 (0.53) ‐0.07 (‐0.69) 0.38 (2.15) 0.04 (0.34) ‐0.00 (‐0.07)
Spread 2.25 (12.10) 2.58 (12.30) 2.87 (9.64) 0.20 (1.38) 0.37 (1.94) 0.39 (2.99) ‐0.08 (‐0.40) 0.27 (1.11) 0.14 (0.84) ‐0.33 (‐1.89) 0.07 (0.46) ‐0.17 (‐1.28)
Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period
Evaluation





























1 1.01 (9.04) 1.10 (7.05) 0.94 (7.42) 0.11 (1.43) 0.17 (1.49) 0.09 (1.30) 0.05 (0.55) 0.14 (1.58) 0.04 (1.21) 0.08 (0.69) 0.14 (1.69) 0.13 (1.64)
2 0.52 (10.2) 0.48 (7.52) 0.41 (7.63) 0.04 (0.87) ‐0.00 (‐0.09) ‐0.00 (‐0.07) 0.01 (0.31) ‐0.08 (‐1.08) ‐0.04 (‐0.51) 0.06 (1.29) 0.02 (0.23) ‐0.03 (‐0.30)
3 0.38 (9.86) 0.32 (7.78) 0.27 (6.61) 0.11 (1.71) 0.06 (0.94) ‐0.02 (‐0.46) 0.11 (1.78) 0.01 (0.16) ‐0.07 (‐1.27) 0.16 (2.22) ‐0.03 (‐0.40) ‐0.14 (‐2.10)
4 0.28 (8.74) 0.21 (6.17) 0.17 (4.85) 0.06 (1.38) 0.01 (0.36) 0.00 (0.13) 0.02 (0.52) 0.02 (0.36) ‐0.01 (‐0.17) 0.07 (0.97) 0.00 (0.04) 0.03 (0.47)
5 0.20 (6.89) 0.12 (4.92) 0.09 (3.11) 0.07 (1.49) 0.06 (0.98) 0.02 (0.41) ‐0.03 (‐0.44) 0.03 (0.71) 0.00 (0.04) ‐0.00 (‐0.00) 0.07 (1.07) 0.04 (0.77)
6 0.12 (4.29) 0.05 (2.14) 0.02 (1.06) 0.14 (2.32) 0.01 (0.38) ‐0.00 (‐0.04) 0.13 (3.62) 0.04 (0.66) ‐0.00 (‐0.05) 0.11 (1.80) 0.15 (1.72) 0.02 (0.54)
7 0.04 (1.43) ‐0.02 (‐1.02) ‐0.04 (‐1.72) 0.13 (2.46) 0.12 (1.90) 0.03 (0.70) 0.12 (2.65) 0.11 (2.36) 0.05 (1.17) 0.14 (2.40) 0.02 (0.36) 0.04 (1.08)
8 ‐0.05 (‐1.89) ‐0.11 (‐4.65) ‐0.12 (‐5.22) 0.14 (2.57) 0.11 (2.18) 0.01 (0.32) 0.10 (1.62) 0.02 (0.35) 0.03 (0.51) 0.09 (2.04) 0.01 (0.27) 0.06 (0.77)
9 ‐0.17 (‐4.74) ‐0.22 (‐7.56) ‐0.23 (‐8.55) 0.22 (3.95) 0.03 (0.91) 0.10 (2.17) 0.23 (2.84) 0.10 (1.32) 0.02 (0.27) 0.22 (3.17) 0.11 (1.37) ‐0.00 (‐0.09)
10 ‐0.45 (‐7.92) ‐0.53 (‐9.89) ‐0.55 (‐10.6) 0.30 (3.00) 0.18 (3.06) 0.10 (1.88) 0.34 (4.08) 0.29 (3.62) 0.21 (2.74) 0.28 (4.62) 0.24 (2.75) 0.16 (1.86)
Spread 1.46 (10.5) 1.63 (9.05) 1.49 (10.0) ‐0.18 (‐1.32) 0.00 (0.04) ‐0.02 (‐0.25) ‐0.29 (‐2.01) ‐0.14 (‐1.45) ‐0.18 (‐2.30) ‐0.24 (‐2.26) ‐0.11 (‐1.25) ‐0.07 (‐1.01)
Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period
Evaluation




























1 1.71 (12.6) 2.51 (9.41) 0.39 (4.06) 0.67 (2.74) 0.17 (1.61) 0.53 (2.22) 0.20 (2.14) 0.34 (1.47)
2 0.81 (10.1) 1.32 (7.14) 0.25 (3.74) 0.43 (2.58) 0.13 (2.16) 0.46 (2.08) 0.13 (1.85) 0.29 (1.55)
3 0.51 (8.53) 0.87 (6.78) 0.17 (2.94) 0.29 (2.31) 0.17 (1.87) 0.43 (2.70) 0.11 (2.31) 0.17 (0.99)
4 0.32 (6.45) 0.62 (5.61) 0.18 (3.10) 0.30 (2.03) 0.13 (2.62) 0.27 (1.75) 0.14 (2.67) 0.21 (1.44)
5 0.18 (4.07) 0.41 (3.98) 0.12 (2.99) 0.33 (2.38) 0.06 (1.02) 0.33 (2.64) 0.13 (2.19) 0.26 (2.02)
6 0.05 (1.30) 0.22 (2.21) 0.12 (2.39) 0.25 (2.41) 0.10 (2.48) 0.20 (1.55) 0.12 (2.57) 0.22 (2.08)
7 ‐0.07 (‐1.76) 0.02 (0.22) 0.04 (0.65) 0.19 (1.63) 0.10 (2.43) 0.30 (2.83) 0.08 (1.57) 0.25 (1.97)
8 ‐0.22 (‐4.83) ‐0.23 (‐1.77) 0.09 (1.85) 0.18 (1.29) 0.13 (2.32) 0.17 (1.23) 0.08 (1.55) 0.17 (1.53)
9 ‐0.44 (‐7.67) ‐0.62 (‐3.45) 0.11 (2.03) 0.12 (0.59) 0.12 (2.01) 0.12 (0.75) 0.10 (1.43) 0.24 (1.06)
10 ‐1.13 (‐10.3) ‐1.55 (‐5.50) 0.05 (0.65) 0.13 (0.59) 0.13 (1.70) 0.10 (0.53) 0.08 (1.13) 0.48 (1.36)
Spread 2.83 (15.7) 4.08 (12.2) 0.29 (3.68) 0.56 (2.52) 0.04 (0.46) 0.34 (1.48) 0.12 (2.52) ‐0.19 (‐0.50)
Formation period First period Second period Third period
Evaluation






































1 1.84 (7.11) 1.90 (5.42) 2.07 (6.63) 0.45 (1.48) 0.61 (2.46) 0.34 (1.35) 0.21 (1.25) 0.51 (1.65) 0.26 (1.06) 0.14 (0.62) 0.36 (0.81) ‐0.06 (‐0.25)
2 0.86 (7.50) 0.76 (5.88) 0.75 (7.17) 0.27 (2.05) 0.11 (0.61) ‐0.14 (‐0.69) 0.27 (1.08) 0.36 (1.13) ‐0.04 (‐0.37) ‐0.05 (‐0.33) 0.24 (1.48) 0.04 (0.33)
3 0.58 (6.70) 0.48 (4.70) 0.48 (5.65) 0.14 (1.45) 0.30 (1.07) ‐0.14 (‐0.75) ‐0.00 (‐0.06) 0.03 (0.18) 0.16 (1.01) 0.18 (1.78) 0.06 (0.32) 0.10 (0.53)
4 0.40 (5.01) 0.26 (2.95) 0.28 (4.01) 0.23 (2.03) 0.15 (0.87) 0.12 (0.54) 0.03 (0.16) 0.17 (1.54) ‐0.06 (‐0.34) ‐0.23 (‐1.05) ‐0.24 (‐1.47) ‐0.19 (‐1.16)
5 0.25 (3.56) 0.07 (0.99) 0.09 (1.23) 0.25 (2.72) ‐0.04 (‐0.46) 0.03 (0.17) 0.29 (1.64) ‐0.11 (‐0.61) 0.05 (0.23) ‐0.02 (‐0.22) 0.10 (0.68) 0.10 (0.36)
6 0.10 (1.69) ‐0.06 (‐0.81) ‐0.10 (‐1.43) 0.32 (3.28) 0.05 (0.46) 0.00 (0.04) 0.16 (2.07) 0.06 (0.46) ‐0.01 (‐0.13) 0.05 (0.78) 0.01 (0.10) ‐0.01 (‐0.13)
7 ‐0.04 (‐0.69) ‐0.23 (‐2.68) ‐0.30 (‐3.55) 0.20 (2.78) 0.02 (0.17) ‐0.21 (‐0.93) 0.06 (1.07) ‐0.14 (‐1.11) 0.14 (1.29) 0.49 (1.61) ‐0.03 (‐0.22) 0.00 (0.01)
8 ‐0.22 (‐2.90) ‐0.42 (‐4.41) ‐0.49 (‐5.17) 0.08 (0.74) 0.09 (1.10) 0.00 (0.06) 0.16 (1.04) 0.04 (0.34) ‐0.09 (‐1.05) 0.21 (1.63) ‐0.07 (‐0.58) 0.01 (0.08)
9 ‐0.45 (‐4.59) ‐0.63 (‐5.47) ‐0.78 (‐6.30) 0.22 (1.41) 0.24 (2.72) 0.10 (1.38) 0.07 (0.40) ‐0.08 (‐0.50) ‐0.06 (‐0.36) 0.23 (1.62) 0.15 (0.66) ‐0.10 (‐0.55)
10 ‐1.07 (‐7.42) ‐1.26 (‐5.97) ‐1.59 (‐5.78) 0.16 (1.01) ‐0.14 (‐0.65) ‐0.25 (‐1.26) 0.40 (1.58) 0.18 (1.43) 0.01 (0.08) 0.52 (1.49) 0.09 (0.43) ‐0.03 (‐0.22)
Spread 2.91 (9.45) 3.17 (8.36) 3.66 (7.81) 0.29 (0.75) 0.75 (2.22) 0.59 (1.81) ‐0.18 (‐0.51) 0.33 (0.93) 0.24 (0.83) ‐0.37 (‐1.04) 0.27 (0.78) ‐0.02 (‐0.09)
Low Fees
Decile
1 1.01 (9.98) 1.01 (12.9) 1.05 (10.0) 0.24 (2.34) 0.12 (1.05) 0.24 (2.52) 0.05 (0.30) 0.05 (0.51) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.14) ‐0.11 (‐1.36) ‐0.28 (‐1.63)
2 0.54 (6.58) 0.48 (6.73) 0.51 (5.74) 0.08 (1.05) 0.10 (1.09) ‐0.09 (‐0.64) 0.13 (1.74) 0.05 (0.40) ‐0.09 (‐0.93) ‐0.11 (‐1.60) 0.01 (0.20) 0.03 (0.25)
3 0.38 (5.13) 0.30 (4.33) 0.29 (3.02) 0.17 (2.32) 0.08 (0.86) 0.11 (0.76) 0.14 (1.05) 0.09 (0.59) 0.09 (0.76) ‐0.02 (‐0.32) ‐0.00 (‐0.04) ‐0.14 (‐0.90)
4 0.26 (3.54) 0.19 (2.73) 0.17 (1.83) 0.04 (0.36) 0.20 (2.55) 0.05 (0.51) 0.03 (0.21) 0.08 (0.95) 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.77) ‐0.10 (‐1.36) ‐0.10 (‐0.88)
5 0.15 (2.29) 0.08 (1.23) 0.05 (0.53) 0.02 (0.33) 0.03 (0.34) 0.03 (0.27) 0.21 (1.84) ‐0.00 (‐0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.08 (1.06) 0.12 (2.14) 0.11 (0.96)
6 0.05 (0.81) ‐0.00 (‐0.06) ‐0.06 (‐0.65) 0.10 (0.86) ‐0.14 (‐2.27) ‐0.01 (‐0.16) 0.13 (1.31) 0.07 (0.61) 0.04 (0.34) 0.09 (0.65) ‐0.02 (‐0.45) 0.02 (0.23)
7 ‐0.04 (‐0.66) ‐0.11 (‐1.63) ‐0.17 (‐1.73) 0.10 (0.93) ‐0.10 (‐1.09) ‐0.10 (‐0.89) 0.15 (1.46) ‐0.06 (‐0.52) ‐0.01 (‐0.15) 0.05 (0.45) 0.03 (0.32) ‐0.09 (‐0.88)
8 ‐0.16 (‐2.42) ‐0.23 (‐3.40) ‐0.29 (‐2.73) 0.12 (1.00) 0.10 (1.46) ‐0.12 (‐1.00) 0.16 (1.06) 0.06 (0.69) ‐0.05 (‐0.23) 0.06 (0.88) ‐0.04 (‐0.58) 0.01 (0.12)
9 ‐0.32 (‐3.96) ‐0.39 (‐5.02) ‐0.44 (‐3.83) 0.08 (0.91) ‐0.07 (‐0.96) ‐0.08 (‐0.67) 0.10 (0.99) ‐0.02 (‐0.27) 0.08 (0.61) 0.18 (1.64) ‐0.01 (‐0.12) ‐0.19 (‐1.42)
10 ‐0.72 (‐7.02) ‐0.82 (‐7.60) ‐0.95 (‐8.75) 0.05 (0.37) ‐0.03 (‐0.23) ‐0.21 (‐1.05) 0.06 (0.70) 0.04 (0.44) ‐0.11 (‐0.86) 0.13 (0.89) ‐0.12 (‐0.91) 0.03 (0.19)











Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period







1 1.58 (8.20) 1.80 (6.92) 1.72 (9.59) 0.30 (1.45) 0.55 (2.22) 0.28 (1.30) 0.23 (1.00) 0.54 (1.57) 0.01 (0.04) 0.19 (1.65) 0.03 (0.13) ‐0.16 (‐0.72)
2 0.76 (6.73) 0.74 (6.28) 0.74 (8.92) 0.14 (1.24) ‐0.05 (‐0.48) ‐0.05 (‐0.47) 0.05 (0.43) 0.02 (0.16) ‐0.29 (‐2.41) ‐0.06 (‐0.42) 0.31 (0.88) 0.05 (0.35)
3 0.48 (5.29) 0.43 (5.75) 0.45 (7.82) 0.16 (1.23) 0.02 (0.21) ‐0.01 (‐0.07) 0.13 (1.19) ‐0.05 (‐0.30) 0.08 (0.63) 0.01 (0.05) ‐0.09 (‐0.76) 0.28 (1.34)
4 0.31 (3.90) 0.21 (3.54) 0.26 (4.06) 0.05 (0.48) 0.35 (1.42) ‐0.05 (‐0.36) 0.08 (0.56) 0.10 (0.96) 0.07 (0.28) ‐0.04 (‐0.52) 0.03 (0.21) ‐0.15 (‐1.53)
5 0.18 (2.80) 0.10 (1.66) 0.11 (1.79) ‐0.06 (‐0.59) 0.01 (0.35) 0.07 (0.67) 0.00 (0.01) ‐0.07 (‐1.25) ‐0.12 (‐0.68) 0.03 (0.37) ‐0.02 (‐0.27) ‐0.06 (‐0.61)
6 0.06 (0.97) ‐0.01 (‐0.17) ‐0.05 (‐0.77) 0.06 (0.77) ‐0.00 (‐0.10) 0.13 (1.62) 0.12 (1.52) ‐0.00 (‐0.10) ‐0.13 (‐0.94) 0.37 (2.15) 0.01 (0.22) 0.13 (0.79)
7 ‐0.06 (‐0.95) ‐0.17 (‐2.24) ‐0.22 (‐2.83) 0.13 (1.51) ‐0.10 (‐0.94) ‐0.20 (‐1.13) ‐0.04 (‐0.28) ‐0.06 (‐0.48) 0.06 (0.66) 0.13 (0.83) 0.10 (0.84) ‐0.00 (‐0.09)
8 ‐0.21 (‐2.66) ‐0.35 (‐3.66) ‐0.41 (‐4.66) 0.21 (1.17) 0.06 (0.74) 0.00 (0.03) 0.20 (2.23) 0.00 (0.01) ‐0.04 (‐0.53) 0.20 (1.77) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.30)
9 ‐0.44 (‐4.25) ‐0.59 (‐6.06) ‐0.69 (‐7.44) 0.00 (0.02) 0.05 (0.38) 0.12 (1.25) 0.21 (1.34) 0.18 (1.20) 0.03 (0.31) 0.17 (1.68) 0.00 (0.07) 0.09 (0.53)
10 ‐1.03 (‐7.21) ‐1.19 (‐6.74) ‐1.44 (‐6.12) 0.04 (0.19) ‐0.31 (‐1.49) ‐0.44 (‐2.31) 0.14 (1.41) 0.11 (0.71) ‐0.10 (‐0.62) 0.41 (1.98) 0.28 (1.56) ‐0.06 (‐0.58)
Spread 2.61 (11.5) 3.00 (10.2) 3.17 (9.10) 0.25 (1.23) 0.86 (2.96) 0.72 (2.45) 0.09 (0.42) 0.43 (1.06) 0.11 (0.41) ‐0.22 (‐0.97) ‐0.25 (‐1.30) ‐0.09 (‐0.49)
High AUM
Decile
1 1.24 (8.27) 1.21 (7.55) 1.54 (7.28) 0.24 (1.56) 0.27 (1.46) 0.22 (1.51) 0.09 (0.74) 0.16 (0.92) 0.06 (0.34) 0.04 (0.21) 0.13 (0.76) ‐0.15 (‐0.87)
2 0.65 (8.58) 0.58 (6.68) 0.56 (5.53) 0.14 (1.31) 0.00 (0.09) 0.03 (0.18) 0.23 (1.74) 0.01 (0.13) ‐0.10 (‐0.71) 0.16 (1.92) 0.07 (0.80) ‐0.07 (‐0.47)
3 0.48 (7.25) 0.37 (5.36) 0.34 (3.54) 0.21 (2.13) 0.12 (1.29) ‐0.00 (‐0.03) 0.05 (0.51) 0.11 (0.97) ‐0.11 (‐0.83) 0.09 (1.03) ‐0.07 (‐0.44) ‐0.14 (‐0.83)
4 0.34 (5.36) 0.25 (3.85) 0.20 (2.23) 0.17 (1.87) 0.05 (0.63) 0.20 (1.81) 0.13 (0.98) 0.09 (0.96) ‐0.07 (‐0.53) 0.05 (0.41) 0.02 (0.26) ‐0.03 (‐0.19)
5 0.22 (3.09) 0.14 (2.14) 0.09 (1.05) 0.19 (1.95) ‐0.03 (‐0.26) ‐0.15 (‐1.19) 0.18 (1.68) ‐0.04 (‐0.33) 0.04 (0.28) 0.04 (0.52) 0.11 (1.17) 0.30 (2.45)
6 0.10 (1.54) 0.02 (0.40) ‐0.01 (‐0.13) 0.12 (1.58) 0.00 (0.02) ‐0.01 (‐0.11) 0.15 (1.47) 0.00 (0.07) ‐0.02 (‐0.12) 0.21 (1.80) 0.05 (0.45) ‐0.01 (‐0.09)
7 0.00 (0.01) ‐0.09 (‐1.30) ‐0.14 (‐1.49) 0.05 (0.57) 0.01 (0.16) 0.07 (0.46) 0.09 (1.12) 0.04 (0.55) 0.16 (1.53) 0.01 (0.17) 0.01 (0.13) ‐0.14 (‐0.85)
8 ‐0.15 (‐2.02) ‐0.25 (‐3.22) ‐0.31 (‐2.72) 0.11 (1.04) 0.17 (1.60) ‐0.00 (‐0.04) 0.13 (1.17) ‐0.16 (‐1.10) 0.08 (0.64) 0.13 (1.31) ‐0.07 (‐0.69) ‐0.01 (‐0.09)
9 ‐0.32 (‐4.15) ‐0.44 (‐5.21) ‐0.48 (‐3.97) 0.04 (0.40) ‐0.06 (‐0.54) ‐0.05 (‐0.50) 0.18 (1.36) 0.07 (0.54) ‐0.14 (‐1.08) 0.16 (1.10) 0.06 (0.45) ‐0.12 (‐0.79)
10 ‐0.77 (‐7.68) ‐0.95 (‐6.36) ‐1.09 (‐6.22) 0.18 (1.29) 0.04 (0.30) ‐0.02 (‐0.20) 0.26 (1.45) 0.08 (0.85) 0.01 (0.11) 0.35 (1.83) ‐0.10 (‐0.59) 0.04 (0.26)
Spread 2.02 (11.1) 2.17 (11.1) 2.63 (8.46) 0.06 (0.30) 0.23 (1.19) 0.25 (1.91) ‐0.16 (‐0.77) 0.07 (0.41) 0.05 (0.30) ‐0.30 (‐1.37) 0.24 (1.73) ‐0.20 (‐1.40)
4 Factor 6 Factor6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor
6 Factor
Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period












1 1.36 (8.16) 1.46 (7.09) 1.62 (8.20) 0.31 (1.85) 0.25 (1.30) 0.21 (1.51) 0.08 (0.48) 0.13 (0.70) 0.00 (0.02) 0.05 (0.34) 0.05 (0.34) ‐0.23 (‐1.30)
2 0.68 (8.95) 0.65 (8.82) 0.63 (7.98) 0.08 (1.10) 0.07 (0.85) 0.02 (0.13) 0.13 (1.24) 0.13 (0.80) ‐0.07 (‐0.58) 0.05 (0.69) 0.06 (0.37) ‐0.10 (‐0.78)
3 0.47 (7.14) 0.39 (6.41) 0.38 (4.75) 0.20 (2.42) 0.18 (1.39) 0.03 (0.23) 0.09 (0.79) 0.12 (1.35) ‐0.11 (‐0.75) 0.02 (0.24) ‐0.05 (‐0.48) 0.03 (0.26)
4 0.33 (5.53) 0.23 (4.01) 0.22 (2.76) 0.13 (1.26) 0.01 (0.10) 0.05 (0.32) 0.17 (1.54) 0.09 (0.76) ‐0.07 (‐0.48) 0.03 (0.39) 0.04 (0.46) ‐0.15 (‐0.98)
5 0.21 (3.56) 0.12 (2.05) 0.09 (1.14) 0.16 (1.86) 0.12 (1.85) ‐0.00 (‐0.06) 0.15 (1.63) ‐0.03 (‐0.34) 0.14 (1.12) 0.19 (1.49) 0.13 (1.21) 0.04 (0.27)
6 0.09 (1.62) ‐0.00 (‐0.06) ‐0.04 (‐0.57) 0.17 (1.94) 0.03 (0.44) ‐0.05 (‐0.66) 0.12 (1.62) ‐0.00 (‐0.05) ‐0.03 (‐0.32) ‐0.01 (‐0.22) 0.03 (0.31) 0.09 (1.14)
7 ‐0.05 (‐0.91) ‐0.14 (‐2.53) ‐0.18 (‐1.98) 0.07 (0.70) ‐0.00 (‐0.00) 0.06 (0.52) 0.09 (1.34) ‐0.00 (‐0.01) ‐0.00 (‐0.05) 0.14 (2.12) 0.02 (0.21) ‐0.03 (‐0.24)
8 ‐0.19 (‐3.12) ‐0.32 (‐4.60) ‐0.31 (‐3.37) ‐0.03 (‐0.37) ‐0.02 (‐0.23) ‐0.02 (‐0.14) 0.19 (1.37) 0.02 (0.17) ‐0.00 (‐0.09) 0.13 (1.65) ‐0.02 (‐0.17) ‐0.03 (‐0.27)
9 ‐0.40 (‐5.31) ‐0.50 (‐5.87) ‐0.56 (‐5.55) 0.17 (1.57) ‐0.01 (‐0.12) ‐0.07 (‐0.72) 0.13 (1.37) ‐0.05 (‐0.44) ‐0.06 (‐0.71) 0.17 (1.64) ‐0.05 (‐0.50) ‐0.07 (‐0.70)
10 ‐0.87 (‐7.95) ‐1.04 (‐7.51) ‐1.18 (‐6.79) 0.05 (0.47) ‐0.05 (‐0.40) ‐0.16 (‐1.47) 0.20 (1.60) 0.00 (0.11) ‐0.05 (‐0.54) 0.44 (2.21) 0.04 (0.30) ‐0.01 (‐0.14)
Spread 2.23 (10.4) 2.51 (10.3) 2.81 (9.38) 0.25 (1.40) 0.30 (1.62) 0.38 (2.70) ‐0.12 (‐0.54) 0.12 (0.57) 0.05 (0.30) ‐0.38 (‐1.82) 0.00 (0.06) ‐0.21 (‐1.53)
Broad Mandate
Decile
1 1.35 (9.54) 1.48 (8.42) 1.51 (7.46) 0.40 (2.08) 0.67 (2.40) 0.32 (1.76) 0.49 (2.50) 0.35 (1.94) ‐0.03 (‐0.09) 0.35 (2.20) 0.39 (2.02) 0.11 (0.70)
2 0.65 (8.12) 0.62 (8.29) 0.73 (6.10) 0.14 (0.99) 0.17 (1.95) 0.38 (2.17) ‐0.00 (‐0.03) 0.08 (0.84) 0.20 (1.26) 0.11 (0.98) 0.17 (1.68) ‐0.05 (‐0.30)
3 0.44 (6.91) 0.37 (6.36) 0.41 (7.12) 0.27 (2.73) 0.11 (1.09) ‐0.11 (‐1.15) 0.20 (1.57) ‐0.04 (‐0.13) 0.00 (0.04) 0.04 (0.48) 0.14 (1.15) 0.05 (0.28)
4 0.27 (4.40) 0.19 (3.71) 0.25 (5.34) ‐0.01 (‐0.21) 0.13 (0.89) 0.07 (0.65) 0.19 (1.46) ‐0.04 (‐0.27) 0.03 (0.24) 0.02 (0.33) ‐0.10 (‐1.32) 0.06 (0.50)
5 0.16 (2.65) 0.06 (1.16) 0.12 (2.16) 0.20 (2.00) 0.04 (0.60) 0.00 (0.04) 0.11 (1.13) 0.08 (0.85) 0.28 (3.04) 0.09 (1.08) ‐0.07 (‐0.72) 0.14 (1.40)
6 0.06 (0.98) ‐0.03 (‐0.68) ‐0.07 (‐1.50) 0.10 (1.31) 0.07 (1.37) 0.20 (1.77) 0.17 (1.62) ‐0.02 (‐0.26) 0.10 (0.70) 0.21 (1.77) 0.06 (0.73) 0.02 (0.26)
7 ‐0.04 (‐0.69) ‐0.14 (‐2.51) ‐0.25 (‐2.88) 0.14 (2.12) ‐0.00 (‐0.01) 0.17 (1.04) ‐0.00 (‐0.02) ‐0.12 (‐1.04) 0.02 (0.23) 0.27 (1.33) ‐0.05 (‐0.36) 0.16 (0.84)
8 ‐0.15 (‐2.66) ‐0.26 (‐3.94) ‐0.37 (‐4.19) 0.13 (1.30) 0.09 (0.86) ‐0.17 (‐1.06) 0.07 (0.56) ‐0.01 (‐0.18) 0.03 (0.36) ‐0.01 (‐0.08) ‐0.04 (‐0.33) 0.06 (0.37)
9 ‐0.36 (‐3.21) ‐0.42 (‐5.45) ‐0.59 (‐4.18) 0.11 (0.89) 0.23 (1.06) 0.24 (1.69) 0.30 (2.75) 0.36 (1.91) ‐0.08 (‐0.86) 0.25 (1.01) ‐0.00 (‐0.02) ‐0.01 (‐0.06)
10 ‐0.76 (‐6.06) ‐1.02 (‐4.93) ‐1.36 (‐5.45) 0.33 (2.22) ‐0.33 (‐0.97) ‐0.71 (‐1.77) 0.14 (1.20) 0.26 (1.09) 0.05 (0.32) 0.16 (0.92) 0.17 (0.80) 0.06 (0.41)
Spread 2.11 (10.0) 2.51 (10.3) 2.88 (7.60) 0.06 (0.30) 1.00 (2.22) 1.03 (2.18) 0.35 (1.61) 0.09 (0.28) ‐0.09 (‐0.23) 0.19 (0.80) 0.22 (0.96) 0.05 (0.22)
4 Factor 6 Factor6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor
Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period
6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor
Evaluation
Evaluation








1 1.14 (6.28) 1.27 (7.03) 1.63 (5.75) 0.29 (1.47) 0.36 (1.29) 0.31 (1.56) ‐0.02 (‐0.13) 0.21 (0.90) 0.06 (0.26) 0.07 (0.35) 0.20 (0.79) ‐0.20 (‐0.89)
2 0.61 (5.82) 0.65 (6.09) 0.66 (7.06) 0.06 (0.53) 0.15 (1.17) 0.09 (0.46) 0.19 (1.41) 0.09 (0.38) ‐0.13 (‐0.74) 0.08 (0.74) 0.12 (0.65) 0.08 (0.46)
3 0.44 (4.34) 0.38 (4.02) 0.39 (4.22) 0.18 (1.27) 0.28 (1.71) 0.07 (0.39) 0.01 (0.11) 0.14 (1.07) 0.03 (0.16) 0.08 (0.55) 0.02 (0.11) 0.08 (0.38)
4 0.31 (3.19) 0.23 (2.50) 0.21 (1.88) 0.23 (1.55) 0.04 (0.30) 0.13 (0.73) 0.23 (1.22) 0.18 (1.00) ‐0.15 (‐0.71) 0.09 (0.63) 0.12 (0.97) ‐0.16 (‐0.96)
5 0.19 (1.99) 0.14 (1.51) 0.09 (0.75) 0.12 (1.01) 0.19 (2.03) 0.07 (0.37) 0.17 (1.65) ‐0.05 (‐0.38) 0.29 (1.50) 0.25 (1.76) 0.19 (1.50) 0.24 (1.27)
6 0.09 (0.95) 0.01 (0.17) ‐0.03 (‐0.28) 0.21 (1.58) ‐0.01 (‐0.09) ‐0.09 (‐0.64) 0.13 (1.08) 0.00 (0.03) ‐0.06 (‐0.37) ‐0.04 (‐0.25) 0.02 (0.19) ‐0.04 (‐0.32)
7 ‐0.03 (‐0.36) ‐0.12 (‐1.36) ‐0.16 (‐1.16) 0.02 (0.21) ‐0.00 (‐0.06) 0.12 (0.61) 0.17 (2.01) 0.07 (0.71) 0.18 (1.46) 0.16 (2.13) 0.04 (0.26) 0.07 (0.37)
8 ‐0.18 (‐1.84) ‐0.29 (‐2.83) ‐0.29 (‐1.89) ‐0.10 (‐0.71) ‐0.01 (‐0.09) 0.01 (0.07) 0.33 (1.86) 0.19 (1.16) ‐0.05 (‐0.28) 0.20 (1.82) 0.01 (0.13) 0.04 (0.31)
9 ‐0.40 (‐3.26) ‐0.46 (‐3.86) ‐0.54 (‐3.30) 0.20 (1.37) 0.01 (0.09) ‐0.14 (‐0.67) 0.24 (2.07) 0.05 (0.31) 0.00 (0.08) 0.22 (1.40) ‐0.09 (‐0.72) ‐0.15 (‐1.00)
10 ‐0.81 (‐4.67) ‐0.92 (‐5.52) ‐0.97 (‐5.02) 0.05 (0.29) ‐0.05 (‐0.37) 0.00 (0.03) 0.41 (2.92) 0.12 (1.08) ‐0.00 (‐0.05) 0.46 (1.92) 0.09 (0.52) 0.06 (0.43)
Spread 1.95 (7.32) 2.20 (9.35) 2.61 (6.55) 0.24 (1.42) 0.42 (1.59) 0.31 (1.89) ‐0.44 (‐1.84) 0.08 (0.32) 0.07 (0.29) ‐0.39 (‐1.64) 0.10 (0.53) ‐0.26 (‐1.66)
Ranking results from 2000‐2007
Decile
1 1.65 (8.07) 1.76 (5.06) 1.67 (6.07) 0.34 (1.70) 0.25 (2.65) 0.17 (1.25) 0.37 (2.56) 0.23 (1.64) 0.04 (0.50) 0.10 (0.70) ‐0.13 (‐0.95) ‐0.27 (‐1.26)
2 0.76 (6.99) 0.67 (5.32) 0.66 (4.78) 0.15 (1.08) ‐0.06 (‐0.70) ‐0.11 (‐1.05) 0.24 (3.86) ‐0.07 (‐0.55) ‐0.10 (‐0.80) 0.08 (0.60) ‐0.05 (‐0.55) ‐0.16 (‐1.54)
3 0.51 (6.29) 0.41 (4.91) 0.42 (3.63) ‐0.01 (‐0.21) ‐0.02 (‐0.41) ‐0.11 (‐1.95) 0.12 (3.05) 0.07 (0.70) ‐0.15 (‐1.30) ‐0.07 (‐2.54) ‐0.01 (‐0.21) ‐0.13 (‐1.39)
4 0.34 (4.68) 0.23 (3.46) 0.23 (2.45) 0.20 (2.34) ‐0.09 (‐0.83) 0.01 (0.16) 0.15 (1.44) ‐0.20 (‐1.03) ‐0.07 (‐0.63) 0.01 (0.21) ‐0.12 (‐0.93) ‐0.12 (‐1.31)
5 0.21 (3.43) 0.10 (1.60) 0.09 (1.13) 0.07 (1.27) ‐0.00 (‐0.07) ‐0.12 (‐2.07) 0.10 (1.60) 0.02 (0.30) ‐0.08 (‐1.14) ‐0.01 (‐0.43) ‐0.06 (‐1.22) ‐0.17 (‐2.12)
6 0.08 (1.50) ‐0.01 (‐0.31) ‐0.04 (‐0.66) 0.05 (0.94) ‐0.01 (‐0.37) ‐0.03 (‐0.76) 0.06 (0.96) 0.00 (0.08) ‐0.09 (‐0.95) 0.06 (0.71) ‐0.06 (‐0.59) ‐0.05 (‐0.99)
7 ‐0.04 (‐0.79) ‐0.15 (‐2.36) ‐0.18 (‐2.32) 0.20 (1.37) ‐0.03 (‐0.37) ‐0.11 (‐1.73) 0.04 (0.51) ‐0.16 (‐1.75) ‐0.07 (‐1.14) 0.09 (0.81) ‐0.08 (‐0.66) ‐0.16 (‐2.14)
8 ‐0.18 (‐3.85) ‐0.32 (‐3.88) ‐0.35 (‐5.18) 0.10 (1.40) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.23) ‐0.07 (‐0.77) ‐0.14 (‐0.90) ‐0.07 (‐0.82) 0.09 (1.05) 0.00 (0.04) ‐0.01 (‐0.07)
9 ‐0.37 (‐7.61) ‐0.53 (‐4.86) ‐0.61 (‐6.29) 0.13 (1.64) 0.02 (0.34) 0.01 (0.13) ‐0.10 (‐1.00) ‐0.10 (‐1.47) ‐0.12 (‐0.97) 0.12 (1.44) ‐0.12 (‐0.90) ‐0.03 (‐0.15)
10 ‐0.93 (‐10.2) ‐1.19 (‐4.89) ‐1.53 (‐5.32) 0.11 (0.69) ‐0.10 (‐0.37) ‐0.34 (‐1.63) ‐0.13 (‐1.01) ‐0.08 (‐0.42) ‐0.19 (‐0.92) 0.21 (0.92) ‐0.04 (‐0.16) ‐0.17 (‐0.69)
Spread 2.58 (12.3) 2.95 (8.10) 3.20 (7.69) 0.22 (0.76) 0.36 (1.32) 0.51 (2.40) 0.51 (3.60) 0.31 (1.32) 0.23 (1.02) ‐0.11 (‐0.55) ‐0.08 (‐0.38) ‐0.10 (‐0.37)
4 Factor 6 Factor6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor
Formation Period First Period Second Period Third Period
6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor2 Factor 4 Factor 6 Factor 2 Factor 4 Factor
Evaluation



























1 0.13 (3.90) 0.12 (4.40) ‐0.00 (‐0.17) 0.01 (1.09) ‐0.01 (‐0.93) ‐0.01 (‐0.98) ‐0.01 (‐0.65) 0.00 (0.52)
2 0.05 (3.22) 0.05 (4.69) ‐0.01 (‐1.29) ‐0.01 (‐2.14) ‐0.00 (‐0.20) 0.02 (0.70) 0.02 (2.58) 0.00 (0.48)
3 0.02 (2.03) 0.03 (4.03) ‐0.00 (‐0.07) ‐0.00 (‐0.60) ‐0.03 (‐1.86) ‐0.01 (‐1.17) ‐0.02 (‐1.92) ‐0.00 (‐1.40)
4 0.01 (0.89) 0.01 (2.57) 0.00 (0.31) 0.00 (0.62) ‐0.02 (‐1.89) ‐0.00 (‐0.21) ‐0.01 (‐0.74) ‐0.01 (‐1.98)
5 ‐0.00 (‐0.34) 0.00 (0.44) ‐0.01 (‐1.17) ‐0.00 (‐0.95) ‐0.01 (‐0.61) ‐0.00 (‐0.47) ‐0.02 (‐1.11) ‐0.00 (‐0.49)
6 ‐0.01 (‐1.90) ‐0.00 (‐2.02) ‐0.02 (‐1.88) ‐0.00 (‐0.09) ‐0.01 (‐0.85) 0.00 (0.36) ‐0.02 (‐1.21) ‐0.00 (‐0.70)
7 ‐0.03 (‐3.30) ‐0.02 (‐3.92) ‐0.02 (‐2.28) ‐0.00 (‐1.09) ‐0.01 (‐0.97) ‐0.00 (‐0.71) ‐0.01 (‐0.72) ‐0.01 (‐1.64)
8 ‐0.05 (‐4.22) ‐0.03 (‐4.58) ‐0.02 (‐0.96) ‐0.01 (‐1.20) ‐0.00 (‐0.64) ‐0.00 (‐0.09) ‐0.02 (‐1.26) 0.00 (0.02)
9 ‐0.08 (‐4.83) ‐0.06 (‐4.59) ‐0.00 (‐0.69) ‐0.00 (‐0.71) ‐0.01 (‐0.48) ‐0.00 (‐0.26) ‐0.00 (‐0.36) ‐0.00 (‐0.37)
10 ‐0.16 (‐5.18) ‐0.12 (‐5.01) ‐0.01 (‐0.78) ‐0.01 (‐1.17) 0.00 (0.14) ‐0.01 (‐0.96) 0.00 (0.01) ‐0.01 (‐1.27)
Spread 0.30 (5.09) 0.25 (5.30) 0.01 (0.74) 0.04 (1.68) ‐0.02 (‐0.80) 0.00 (‐0.22) ‐0.02 (‐0.64) 0.02 (1.63)
Evaluation
NUS Gamma US Gamma NUS Gamma
Formation period First period Second period Third period

























































































































Histogram of EAFE Gamma
Figure 4: Gamma distributions 
Coefficients are estimated for the entire time series of each global equity portfolio using the factor 
model: 
 
where f are K factors over t periods.  The factors for the model are the US market’s excess return, the 
square of the US market’s excess return, the EAFE market’s excess return, and the square of the EAFE 
market’s excess return.  All factors are taken from Ken French’s data library.  The sample period is 1989‐
2007.  “Gamma” refers to the coefficient of the squared market terms. 
Panel A: US Gamma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: EAFE Gamma 
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Appendix A: Acadian Asset Management, Global Equity Strategy 
The following pages are a sample of the data we have for each manager in the database.  Certain fields, 
like returns and assets under management, are reported for every manager in the database.  Other 
fields, like country allocations, are only reported by a subset of managers.
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 Appendix: Acadian Asset Management, Global Equity Strategy (continued) 
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Appendix: Acadian Asset Management, Global Equity Strategy (continued) 
 
